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Abstract
The descriptive analysis of the functioning of the digital signature architecture based on public key 
infrastructure determined the central objective of all the investigation, for this reason the responsi-
bilities that each Certification Authority exercises in its creation and verification process were exp-
lained, to guarantee the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of the transmitted information. 
The methodology used is documentary through the bibliographic review of the main concepts of 
digital signature, cryptography and PKI obtained from repositories, digital libraries, free access da-
tabase and Google Academic. 
From the study carried out it can be concluded that the digital signature based on the public key 
infrastructure is a transparent process that generates reliability both to the sender and the receiver 
that the keys generated correspond to their legitimate owners, but it is necessary that it is protected 
by an adequate legislative framework, sophisticated hardware and software is used, and each user is 
aware of the responsibilities acquired when implementing it.
Keywords: PKI, digital signature, cryptography, public key. 
Resumen
El análisis descriptivo del funcionamiento de la arquitectura de firma digital con base en infraestruc-
tura de clave pública determinó el objetivo central de toda la investigación, por ello se expusieron las 
responsabilidades, que cada Autoridad de Certificación ejerce en su proceso de creación y verifica-
ción, para garantizar la autenticidad, integridad y no repudio de la información transmitida. La me-
todología utilizada es la documental a través de la revisión bibliográfica de los principales conceptos 
de firma digital, criptografía y PKI obtenida de repositorios, bibliotecas digitales, base de datos de 
libre acceso y Google Académico. 
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especially for the incorporation of digital signa-
ture algorithms (current and not colliding up to 
date) that guarantee the identity of the signer and 
the integrity of a message. However, Espinoza 
(2018) says that given the possibility that an is-
suer or recipient is unknown the authenticity of 
a digitally signed document joined the public key 
infrastructure (PKI) as a mechanism that imple-
ments authorities of Certification to legitimize 
correspondence from the keys to their authentic 
owners, certify the origin of a message, and guard 
to ensure compliance with guidelines and policies 
in their format, among other aspects.
Considering that the digital signature based on 
public key infrastructure possesses cryptographic 
operations that generate greater robustness than 
a signature generated by traditional methods, 
which is currently used in banking, commercial 
applications, and E-government; and that its 
fundamental principles are very similar to those 
of a handwritten signature (only its owner can 
create it, it may be verified by its transmitter and 
receiver, it cannot be repudiated by the sender) 
(Lojan, 2016); It is necessary to know how this 
architecture in real time guarantees the legitimacy 
of a sent message.
Is in that sense, the objective is making a descrip-
tion of the architecture and functionalities that 
certification authorities exercise in the process 
of creation and verification of a digital signature 
based on the public key infrastructure, and thus 
know its reliability in the identification and au-
thentication of the signer and integrity of trans-
mitted data.
A partir del estudio realizado se puede concluir que la firma digital con base en la infraestructura de 
clave pública es un proceso transparente que genera fiabilidad tanto al emisor como al receptor de 
que las claves generadas corresponden a sus legítimos propietarios, pero es necesario que esté ampa-
rada por un marco legislativo adecuado, se emplee un hardware y software sofisticado. 
Palabras Clave:  PKI, firma digital, criptografía, clave pública.
Introduction
Communications networks have evolved vertigi-
nously allowing connectivity in the transmission 
of images, voice and data that transcends borders; 
for this reason every day different business mo-
dels incorporate digital platforms as the main me-
chanism of their financial activities, which has led 
to a greater exchange of information and a raised 
awareness of the level of security of the data and 
messages transferred, which are prone to threats 
of interception and analysis of traffic, identity 
theft, reenactment, modification of messages, and 
fraudulent degradation of service, among others 
(Martin, 2015). 
Taking into account these aspects, companies and 
academies related to Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) have imple-
mented methodologies that can guarantee robust 
security of the information based on four prin-
ciples: I. Confidentiality, the information is hid-
den from unauthorized third parties; II. Integrity, 
the data are genuine and have not been modified 
since their creation; III. Availability, informa-
tion is accessible at any time requested; and IV. 
Non-repudiation, to prove that a message is from 
the sender and avoid the recipient denying ha-
ving received the message (Sánchez & González, 
2016). Urbina (2016) points out that one of the 
methodologies that has provided high efficiency 
guarding the data is cryptography that satisfies 
these pillars through encryption techniques. 
According to Joshi & Karkade (2015) the process 
of encryption and decryption have particular cha-
racteristics according to their nature, asymmetric 
cryptography being one of the more reliable ones, 
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Methods
This article is an investigation of documentary re-
view, which analyzes various sources of literature 
on public key infrastructure and its application in 
the digital signature in order to sustain, that this 
type of signature offers greater reliability and ro-
bustness than other systems of electronic identity, 
being created by asymmetric cryptographic me-
chanisms and backed by certification authorities.
For the selection of bibliographic material, on 
which rests the theoretical framework, included: 
printed and virtual books, obtained from Google 
Books; journal articles indexed in Google Scho-
lar, repositories, digital libraries and open access 
database (SciElo, Wos, Dialnet, Redalyc). In ad-
dition, the following were used as descriptors: 
Cryptography, PKI, digital signature and public 
key infrastructure trusted authorities.
Within the inclusion criteria it was defined that 
articles, books and analyzed documents corres-
pond to the last five years of the issue; resulting in 
major publications of magazines. 
On the other hand, presented literature was qua-
litatively analyzed, helping the distribution of 
this document in sections that include a logical 
sequential structure form in relation to the pu-
blic key infrastructure. It should be noted, that 
this document uses indirect quotations, which are 
presented without quotation marks and include 
the respective bibliographical reference.
Digital signature  
In 1976 American investigators, Whitfield Diffie 
and Martin Hellman explained the structure of 
a digital signature theory, giving the pattern to 
Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman to 
develop the RSA algorithm a year after (Sarava-
nan & Kumar, 2015). This algorithm allowed the 
creation of the first digital signatures, which obe-
yed the same principles of the autograph signatu-
re, but insecurity prevailed, so it was necessary to 
add a cryptographic hash function to the original 
message (Thangavel, 2014). In 1984, Shafi Gold-
wasser, Silvio Micali, and Ronald Rivest propo-
sed the first safety guidelines in a digital signa-
ture; and at the same time, other cryptographic 
schemes were created as: Lamport, Merkle and 
Rabin; which did not acquire greater relevance 
(Thangavel, 2014). Later (1988), the first softwa-
re with commercial purposes for digital signatu-
res was born called Lotus Notes 1.0, it was based 
on RSA (Thangavel, 2014). Three years later, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
of the United States developed the DSA algori-
thm oriented to the Digital Standard Signature 
(DSS) with disadvantages compared to RSA, 
which had a longer computer processing time 
(Nabarjun, 2017). Later (1999), the PDF format 
acquired the ability to embed digital signatures 
to documents, however, it was in the year 2008 
when the International Standardization Organi-
zation (ISO) made this format an open standard 
that included digital signatures as an integral part 
of their scheme, originating that the implemen-
tation of digital signatures had greater acceptance 
in the world (Nabarjun, 2017).
Rocha, Castello & Bollo (2014) point out that 
the digital signature is a cryptographic method 
that allows you to verify the original source of 
a message to subsequently verify that it has not 
been altered. For his part, Gaona, Montenegro & 
Wiesner (2014) established that a digital signatu-
re is the result of encrypting a message using one-
way hash functions that guarantee that the only 
one who can decrypt the message is the recipient 
with its corresponding private key. In the same 
way, Lojan (2016) defines digital signature as a 
variant of the electronic signature, which is built, 
based on asymmetric cryptography allowing the 
association of the identity of the signer with a di-
gital document.
Consequently, a digital signature involves a pro-
cess of encryption (Gallo, 2015), and therefore 
it is necessary to distinguish the term cryptogra-
phy which, according to Zhou, Gong, Fu, & Jin 
(2016) is a discipline that studies the techniques 
to transform a plain text into ciphertext using 
cryptographic keys (parameter that allows a user 
to encrypt or decrypt data) and that in addition, 
it enables the prevention of security flaws in a 
computerized system ensuring the confidentiali-
ty, integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation of 
information (Wadhwa, Hussain & Rizvi, 2013). 
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Medina & Miranda (2015) point out that Cryp-
tography is classified into: symmetrical, which 
uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt the 
data; and asymmetrical, which uses a pair of keys 
(one is published and the other is securely stored) 
but, Boneh & Shoup (2017) demonstrate that 
there is hybrid cryptography, which combines 
the safety of a public key with the efficiency of 
a symmetric key algorithm. In this context, Joshi 
& Karkade (2015) show that asymmetric crypto-
graphy is mostly used in the creation of a digital 
signature because its methodology provides grea-
ter robustness.
In this regard, a digital signature built with asym-
metric cryptography uses two different keys with 
a mathematical relationship among themselves: 
the public key is responsible for coding and the 
private key allows the decryption (Malhotra, 
2015). In the same way, Joshi & Karkade (2015) 
show that when creating a digital signature with 
asymmetric cryptography, algorithms are imple-
mented which generate a pair of complementary 
keys, which performs the process of encryption 
and decryption of a message. In addition, Pra-
mendra & Vijay (2014) point out that the public 
key is freely available, while the user owner only 
knows the private key. Figure 1 shows an outline 
of this process.
Peña (2015) indicates that in an ideal context 
a digital signature has the same properties of a 
handwritten signature, because it is authentic, 
unforgeable, unalterable, non-reusable and can-
not be repudiated; it is important that technolo-
gy, which generates it, provide a secure scheme to 
meet these attributes otherwise could be altered/
corrupted. According to Rocha, Castello & Bo-
llo (2014) a digital signature may be built with 
different techniques, but the standard public key 
infrastructure provides greater robustness since 
the owner has sole control of the signature, the 
verification process is performed for any entity 
who knows the signer’s public key, and the certi-
fication authorities recognize the sender identity. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
With the birth of asymmetric cryptography, the 
problem of key management arose and was miti-
gated with the creation of a directory called Pu-
blic Archive that contained the name, number 
and public key of the recipient (Albarqi, Alzaid, 
Ghamdi, Asiri & Kar, 2015). When the sender 
wanted to send a message, they should look for 
the recipient by name to find the public key, 
which did not offer the necessary guarantees to 
demonstrate that this key belonged to the desi-
red recipient (Afshar, 2015). In 1980 this context 
led the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) to build a directory that could store the 
keys of all persons and devices in the world, which 
gave origin to the X.500 standard that comple-
tely defined the characteristics of that directory 
(Albarqi, Alzaid, Ghamdi, Asiri & Kar, 2015). 
However, given the need to ensure authentica-
tion, the X.509 was born, and pinned down the 
format for digital certificates and incorporated to 
a trusted third party to verify the correspondence 
of a title to a public key, leading to the moment 
in which the concept of PKI arose (Afshar, 2015).
Abobeah, Ezz & Harb (2015) defined public key 
infrastructure as a combination of software, hard-
ware, policies and people that have objectives to 
manage (create, issue, modify, store and delete) 
digital certificates, authenticate the identity of 
the sender and the receiver, and provide data in-
tegrity. For their part, Cantero, Baran & Stuardo 
(2014) indicated that it is an architectural model 
that allows you to manipulate the public keys and 
ensure correspondence to their legitimate owners. 
According to Ramos (2015) a PKI is a set of se-
curity policies, procedures, and technologies to 
create, issue and manage digital certificates based 
on public key cryptography.
Figure 1: Process of encryption and decryption in Cryp-
tography
Source: Medina & Miranda (2015, p.16)
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Consequently, the public key infrastructure is 
used to establish robust authentication services 
and security protocols based on asymmetric cryp-
tography such as IPSec, SSL/TLS; allowing the 
associate of an entity with its pair of generated 
keys, performing the encryption and decryption 
of a message, and ensuring non-repudiation of a 
shipment (Sumalatha & Sathyanarayana, 2015). 
Cantero, Baran & Stuardo (2014) assert that the 
objective of a PKI is to create a document that ve-
rifies the authenticity of a public key, which is ca-
lled a Digital Certificate. Ramos (2015) defines a 
digital certificate as a data structure linking a pu-
blic key to an entity, which has been recognized 
by a Certification Authority, which has a specific 
validity period and includes the digital signature 
of the Authority to validate its legitimacy. Angle 
& Henao (2017) established that a digital certifi-
cate is generally uses usually the X.509 standard 
to define the structure and the corresponding 
fields, and actually said standards were found in 
version 3. Figure 2 details the format of the stan-
dard X.509 v3.
Gutierrez (2014) says that running a cryptogra-
phic operation that uses PKI involved at least 
three elements: i. User, which starts the process; 
ii. Authorities, which validate the certificates; iii. 
Recipient, who receives the encrypted data. In 
addition, Albarqi, et al. (2015) establishe that the 
primary components of a PKI are: i. Registration 
Authority (RA), ii. Certification Authority (CA), 
iii. Security Policies, iv. Trusted applications for 
PKI, v. Distribution Systems and vi. Repository 
of Certificates
According to WebTrust (2017) the registration 
authority (RA) has as function to authenticate 
the identity of the user or device that requires a 
digital certificate but may not issue or sign a cer-
tificate. Similarly, Ormaza, Barrios & Fernandez 
(2017) assert that a RA unequivocally recognizes 
the applicant of a certificate and performs the re-
gistration process for their issuance.
WebTrust (2017) evidences that the certification 
authority (CA) is a trusted third party that guaran-
tees the relationship between the public key and 
the user data registered within a digital certifica-
te. Moreover, Cutanda (2013) says that when the 
CA issues a certificate it generates in the format 
X.509 v3 by adding their digital signature which 
allows a third party to verify its authenticity using 
the public key of the CA. Likewise, the functions 
of the certifying authority are: issue certificates, 
maintain and generate certificates revocation lists 
(CRL) and retain information regarding the expi-
ration dates of certificates (Afshar, 2015).
Nelson & Nordenberg (2016) determined that 
security policies are operating procedures that 
govern the operations of the PKI and have tech-
nical and legal validity, for example: criteria that 
ensure that the method to validate the identity 
of the holder of the certificate is reliable, rules to 
establish who can revoke certificates, measures of 
how to distribute reversa lists, and guidelines that 
determine the frequency for filing certificates, 
among others.
Albarqi et al. (2015) outlined that the PKI-ena-
bled applications are programs/software suitable 
for handling digital certificates, so, for example: 
web browsers, e-mail clients, and operating sys-
tems, among others. 
Nelson & Nordenberg (2016) set up a distribu-
tion system that is intended to automate the ma-
nagement of digital certificates. 
According to MICITT (2018) a Certificates 
Repository stores valid certificates for entities/
applications, which require it to download them. 
These repositories used directories like the X.500 
Figure 2: Format of certificate X.509 version 3
Source: Hawanna, Kulkarni, Rane, Mestri, & Panchal 
(2016, p. 2)(2016, p. 2)
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which are accessible via open protocols that allow 
the consultation of centrally saved information 
through the network, the most used being the Li-
ght Weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)) 
Abobeah, Ezz & Harb, 2015).
Nelson & Nordenberg (2016) show that the ele-
ments of the PKI described above present a pro-
cess interrelated through phases, which begins 
when the applicant appears to the Registration 
Authority (responsible for the capture of regis-
tration information and key generation), and the 
entity communicates with Certification Autho-
rity to transmit the data of the applicant. After 
registration, the applicant can access the Certi-
fication Authority to obtain a digital certificate 
signed by this entity, but custody of the private 
key will be the responsibility of the Recipient du-
ring the valid time of the certificate. It should be 
noted that the applicant (using a cryptographic 
software) or the certification authority (Gallo, 
2015) could perform the asymmetric key gene-
ration process. Figure 3 shows the operation of a 
PKI architecture.
Figure 3: A PKI architecture
Source: Albarqi, Alzaid, Ghamdi, Asiri & Kar (2015, p. 33)
On the other hand, Cuno (2015) evidences that 
given the possibility that a user requires to veri-
fy the legitimacy of a digital certificate they can 
appeal to a Validation Authority (VA), which will 
determine the validity of the document based on 
the CRL or OCSP (Protocol that allows you to 
request the status of a certificate to a server). In 
addition, if necessary, it will include a time stamp 
issued by the Time Stamp Authority, which 
unequivocally recognizes the truth of the certifi-
cate even if it has expired (Sánchez, 2016). 
Digital Signature based on the Infrastructure of 
Public Key 
Peña (2015) defines the digital signature based 
on public key infrastructure as a procedure using 
cryptographic techniques that requires the par-
ticipation of a trusted third party to prove the 
identity of the issuer. In this sense, Ramos (2015) 
says that PKI-based digital signature plays an im-
portant and irreplaceable role in the security of 
electronic transactions, authentication of identi-
ty, digital integrity and non-repudiation; for this 
reason, they are used in software distribution, fi-
nancial transactions and in environments where 
it is important to detect the falsification and ma-
nipulation of data. 
Gaona, Montenegro & Wiesner (2014) show 
that to build a digital signature based on public 
key infrastructure requires a function hash (SHA-
2, SHA-3, RIPEMD-160) which converts a va-
riable-length text in a block of length set in the 
summary form that is irreversible (cannot retrieve 
a text from your summary); and an asymmetric 
algorithm (RSA, DSS, ECDSA) that generates 
two keys, being the public key and the private 
key that allows you to sign and authenticate the 
signature. 
Rocha, Castello & Bollo (2014) indicate when 
the process of signing is in progress; first, the 
sender creates a message, then applies the hash 
function and then encrypts it with their private 
key. A Certification Authority that will validate 
its origin and content shall review each message 
signed by the issuer, and only if it is correct will 
it be sent to the receiver attached to the Digital 
Certificate. Finally, the recipient receives the mes-
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sage with two elements: the message (plaintext or 
encrypted with the public key of the receiver) and 
digital signatures (formed by the hash with the 
private key of the issuer and encrypted with the 
private digital key certificate of the Certification 
Authority).
According to Gallo (2015) to verify the validity 
of a digital signature, the receiver must decrypt 
the digital certificate of the issuer using the pu-
blic key issued by the Certification Authority (ha-
ving accessed the key through the web page of 
the CA). After decoding the certificate, the recei-
ver will know the public key of the issuer, which 
will allow them to decrypt the received hash; and 
if the message was encoded, they can decrypt it 
with their private key. Finally, the receiver com-
pares the hash received from the issuer with their 
hash retrieved, if both are equal it is considered 
that the message is authentic, the digital signature 
corresponding to the sender and that the message 
has been decrypted with a public key and encryp-
ted with a private key. Figure 4 details the Signing 
and Verifying Process of a digital signature based 
in PKI and figure 5 is the frame of reference.
Figure 4: The process of signing and verifying a digital sig-
nature based on PKI
Source: Ramos (2015, p. 3)
Figura 5: Reference framework to register and verify a digi-
tal signature based on PKI
Source: Ramos (2015, p. 4)
Cuno (2015) designates that the process of ge-
nerating and verifying a digital signature based 
on PKI is based on two entities: i. Certification 
Authority, which provides confidence to both 
the transmitter and the receiver that the distribu-
tion of the key is secure; and ii. Revocation List 
of Certificates, which must be 
constantly updated by the co-
rresponding Certification Au-
thority; but it, is necessary that 
the public key infrastructure is 
supported by an appropriate 
legal framework, each autho-
rity that is equipped with a 
secure computer system, and 
that the signer relies on the 
transparency of this process.
On the other hand, Schaett-
gen, Levy, Schelnast & Socol 
(2014) distinguish two types 
of digital signatures, which are 
differentiated by the security 
that is based on authentica-
tion, and are: i. Recognized di-
gital signature (RDS), created 
with a unique device, that is to 
say, distinguished from the one used to sign the 
document (which gives more safety); and ii. Ad-
vanced Digital Signature (ADS), developed with 
the same device that was used to sign the docu-
Analysis of digital signature based on the public key infrastructure 
ISSN 2313-7878.  Hamut’ay 5(2). July-december 2018. pp. 89-98
96
ment, and therefore, is less robust than the RDS. 
In this context, Saavedra & Astolfi (2015) point 
out that cryptographic devices that are imple-
mented for the creation of digital signatures are 
governed to standards such as: FIPS 140-2 level 
3 or Common Criteria ISO 15408 EAL 4 +; and 
one of the most widely used devices is the HSM 
(Hardware Security Module), which generates, 
stores and protects cryptographic keys; Therefo-
re, it provides greater security and performance in 
operations of Cryptography.
In another area, Vigil, Buchmanna, Cabarcasb, 
Weinerta & Wiesmaierc (2015) manifest that 
digitally signed documents are retained for some 
years but if it is required to preserve them by de-
cades or longer time technological problems may 
arise, such as: cryptographic obsolescence, the al-
gorithms can be corrupted in this interval; loss of 
integrity, flaws in the physical devices due to the 
migration of new formats; obsolescence of sof-
tware, evolutionary changes that meet the requi-
rements of the time; obsolescence of hardware, 
physical impairment or technological evolution.
Finally, it is necessary to annotate that the digital 
signature technology based on PKI, in addition 
to being used in the identification and authen-
tication of an entity, can also be implemented in 
electronic commerce, to safeguard a transaction; 
On the network, to identify the authenticity of a 
web site; in software, to prevent their manipula-
tion, among others (Saavedra & Astolfi, 2015).
Conclusions
The development of communications networks 
and the global trend pf mainly implementing 
online trade has aroused increasing interest in 
safeguarding data and information transmitted 
from threats and vulnerabilities that destroy the 
reliability of any web process, therefore the en-
cryption techniques have become a fundamental 
pillar that strengthens the principles of computer 
security (Urbina, 2016). 
Asymmetric cryptography enabled the develop-
ment of the digital signature as a mechanism to 
support that the information exchanged has not 
been altered, through this it is being implemen-
ted with greater consent in transactions where a 
traditional signature is powerless (Joshi & Karka-
de, 2015). 
Coincidentally mentioned by Rocha, Castello & 
Bollo (2014), public key infrastructure constitu-
tes a rigorous architecture, in which each element 
(Authority) has defined roles that guarantee the 
transparency of the process of generation and de-
livery of keys and unambiguously identifies an 
entity, therefore it is the standard most used to 
create safe digital signatures; However, barriers 
such as: the cost of implementation, few specia-
lists in the country and interoperability have li-
mited its use. 
A digital signature based on public key infras-
tructure is a technology that ensures through 
asymmetric algorithms, hash function and di-
gital certificates, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation of a message; and in this sense 
Espinoza (2018) highlights that its correct esta-
blishment should be covered by an adequate le-
gislative framework, use a hardware and sophis-
ticated software, and each user must be aware of 
the responsibilities (cannot disown the authenti-
city of a digitally signed document) that are ac-
quired when they implement it.  It is important 
to highlight that the validity of a digital signature 
is not imperishable, various requirements must 
be met (arising in accordance with technological 
evolution) to ensure its validity in both the long 
and short term. In addition, its scope can be glo-
bal or limited to a territory specific (Vigil et al. 
2015).
It is necessary to increase efforts so that the opera-
tion of the PKI-based digital signature as an ins-
trument of public domain, encourages confiden-
ce in economic, administrative and governmental 
activities so that they increasingly incorporate this 
technology in their processes (Lojan, 2016).
On the other hand, we agree with Saavedra & 
Astolfi (2015), who distinguish that the security 
of an environment is the result of the combina-
tion of various processes and technologies; conse-
quently, a PKI-based digital signature is not the 
solution to all the possible security problems in 
an organization.
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Here we have shown only performance, archi-
tecture and advantages offered by the digital sig-
nature based on the public key infrastructure to 
authenticate a sender and integrity of a message 
based on the exploratory analysis of previous 
works. Therefore, future continuations of this in-
vestigative line could explore which formats, pac-
kaging and levels ensure greater interoperability 
and effectiveness, exposing current regulations in 
Ecuador that protect its legal validity and defi-
ne a model of digital signatures implementation 
(zero papers project) for small and medium-sized 
businesses that have not yet migrated to this te-
chnology. 
In addition, in a following moment, a comparison 
could be made about the performance characte-
ristics of the traditional digital signature algori-
thms like RSA as opposed to elliptic curve based 
on those latest-used keys, which are much smaller 
and provide an equivalent level of security.
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